

Study of Target Selection for Philippine Terrorism Attacks

Iwan Satriawan¹, Muhammad Mustofa²

^{1,2} Department of Criminology, University of Indonesia
FISIP UI Campus Building N1, Jl. Margonda, Pondok Cina, Beji, Depok City, West Java 16424

Corresponding Author: Iwan Satriawan

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ABSTRACT

The Philippine terrorist group is classified as foreign terrorist fighters who carry out acts of terrorism abroad with the aim of, among other things, establishing their own state in the southern Philippines. Of course, apart from committing acts of terrorism within the Philippines. Even though there is a connection between terrorists from Indonesia and terrorists from the Philippines, Filipino terrorists are not indicated to have carried out acts of terror in Indonesia as the target country. This research identifies that terrorist target selection always pays attention to targets, including geographical factors; calculation of political, social and religious factors; rationally and the choice takes into account ideology; terrorist capabilities; probability of attack success (risk with resulting number of victims); as well as, social ties and economic incentives. This target selection can be included in rational choice theory. Based on the perspective of rational choice theory, criminals tend to evaluate before committing by considering the probability of being discovered and caught, the effectiveness and impact of punishment that may be imposed, the potential value of existing crime proceeds and their short-term needs for crime proceeds; strong interactions between ideologies; operational motivations and choices, external mitigating influences.

Keywords: Indonesia, Philippine, target selection, terrorism attacks

INTRODUCTION

In 2000, acts of terrorism began to rise again in Indonesia with the bombing at the Philippine Embassy on 1 August 2000, followed by the bombing at the Jakarta Stock Exchange on 13 September 2000, the throwing of a grenade at the Malaysian Embassy on 27 August 2000 and a series of bombings at night. Christmas 24 December 2000. Acts of terrorism continued in Indonesia in the following years, namely 1) 2001: bombs at the Santa Anna Church and HKBP Jatiwaringi, Plaza Atrium Senen, KFC Makassar and the Australian School in Jakarta; 2) 2002: New Year bombs at the Bulungan Chicken Restaurant, Jakarta and several churches in Palu, Bali bombs, the Philippine Consulate General's office in Manado, Mc Donald's Makassar restaurant; 3) 2003: Wisma Bhayangkari Lobby of Police Headquarters, Terminal F of Soekarno Hatta Airport, and JW Marriot Hotel Jakarta; 4) 2004: bombings in Palopo City, Australian Embassy, Immanuel Church in Palu; 5) 2005: Bombings in Ambon City, Tentena, Pamulang Tangerang, Bali 2, and Market in Palu; 6) 2009: JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Jakarta Hotel Bombings on July 17; 7) 2010: CIMB Niaga Bank Robbery; 8) 2011: Cirebon Malporesta Mosque bomb, planned bomb at Christ Cathedral Gading Serpong Church, and GBIS Kepunton Solo bomb; 9) 2012:

Pospam Gladak grenade explosion in Solo; 10) 2013: Poso Police Headquarters Mosque Bomb; 11) 2016: Bombs and shootings at MH Thamrin, suicide bombs in the courtyard of the Surakarta Police Headquarters and the Santo Yosep Catholic Church in Medan, Molotov cocktails in front of the Samarinda Ecumenical Church, and Molotov cocktails at the Budi Dharma Vihara Singkawang, West Kalimantan; 12) 2017: pot bombs in Kampung Melayu, and pot bombs in Pandawa Park Cicendo Bandung; 13) 2018: hostage-taking of a number of members of Brimob and Densus 88 by inmates at Mako Brimob, suicide bombings at GKI Surabaya, Central Pentecostal Church and Santa Maria Immaculate Church Surabaya and attack on Riau Regional Police Headquarters. (Kompas, 2005; Okezone, 2016; Indopos, 2016; Tribun Pontianak 2016; TribunNews 2017 & 2018, Britatagar.id, 2018).

The terrorist acts above occurred after the fall of the Soeharto regime (Zakiyah, 2016) and there are indications of close ties between Indonesian and Filipino terrorists (Tito Karnavian, 2009: 117; Daljit Singh, 2009: 84); in the form of an emotional relationship due to ideology (Larasati, 2015). This indication is proven by the close relationship between militant Islamic groups in Indonesia and the Philippines which has existed since 1985 when Darul Islam (DI) leaders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir met for the first time with the leader of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Salamat Hashim in Lahore, Pakistan. Indonesian militant Islamic groups DI/NII, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Kompak and Wahdah Islamiyah/Laskar Jundullah joined the Philippines by allying with the MILF, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM). Several terrorists from Indonesia were killed and captured by Philippine security forces (Tito Karnavian, 2009: 117; Daljit Singh, 2009: 84). MILF and JI then established several camps in Mindanao, namely Camp Abu Bakar for Indonesian and Filipino terrorists,

some of whom knew each other when operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as Camp Hudaibiyah for Indonesian, Filipino and Arab terrorists. In addition, the MILF facilitated the establishment of 2 other camps in Mindanao, namely the Sulawesi Camp for terrorists from Sulawesi who were not JI members and had operated in Afghanistan and the Banten Camp for West Java terrorists who were not JI members and had operated in Afghanistan (As'at Said Ali, 2014: 180-181).

It is indicated that four terrorist groups supporting JI are operating in Indonesia, namely Noordin M. Top (Thoifah Muqotilah, WN Malaysia), Poso, Palembang, and Jamaah As-Shunnah (Taufiqurrohman, 2010). Noordin M. Top saw himself as the leader of JI's military wing and received support from JI based in Sumatra, JI graduates of Pondok Pesantren Luqmanul Hakim in Malaysia and Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin in Nguruki, Solo for the bombing at the Marriott Hotel Jakarta on 5 August 2003; JI East Java and Central Java for the Australian Embassy bombing on 9 September 2004. After the Australian Embassy bombing, the Noordin M. Top Group operated independently outside JI central command even though they still considered themselves members of JI (ICG, 2006).

In 2000, the Poso Group under the leadership of Ustaz Rian received training at the JI military camp in Ampana, Toja Una-Una Regency. Poso Group (ICG, 2004). In 2002, the Poso Group under the new leadership of Slamet Rahardjo alias Hasanudin was completely under JI control. The Poso Group divided its targets into 2, namely genuine infidels who were close to the Poso Group to be targeted, namely local Christians and rulers who were considered apostates or thoghut by shooting, bombing and beheading; while the Poso Group does not target distant infidels like the US as its main enemy. The Poso group received funds which all came from Poso, namely monthly infaq (contributions) from its members, fa'i (robbery), donations from JI cadets who

were strategically placed in local government offices (Taufiqurrohman, 2010).

The Palembang group was led by Abdurrahman Taib, Ani Sughandi, Sukarso Abdillah and Singaporean JI member Mohammed Hassan bin Saynudin alias Fajar Taslim. Initially, the Palembang Group eradicated the Christianization movement through the strategy of *iqomatuddin* (enforcing Islam through *da'wah*). After JI exerted influence, Ani Sughandi, Sukarso Abdillah and Mohammed Hassan bin Saynudin refused to pledge allegiance to Abdurrahman Taib and used the *qital jihad* strategy, namely fighting with acts of violence and *nikayah*, namely carrying out revenge attacks against US interests. The Palembang group received bombing training from Reno alias Tedi alias Aji, who was a subordinate of Malaysian terrorist Dr. Azhari (ICG, 2009 and Taufiqurrohman, 2010).

Jamaah As-Shunnah (JA) prioritizes recruiting TNI members and students, especially in West Java. JA collaborates with JI in the military and *da'wah* fields. A JI Subang member named Ustaz Dudung provided military training, while a JI member from the Noordin M. Top network, namely Syaifudin Umar alias Abu Fida, strengthened the *jihad* ideology by taking revenge against the US and emphasizing the importance of carrying out terrorist operations in small units (Taufiqurrohman, 2010). JI is responsible for a series of acts of terrorism in Indonesia (compilation of reports from the *Harian/SKH Kompas* newspaper), including the bombing of the Istiqlal Mosque on 19 April 1999, the bombing of the house of the Philippine Ambassador in Jakarta on 1 August 2000, a number of churches in Batam, Pekanbaru, Jakarta, Sukabumi, Mojokerto, Kudus, and Mataram on 24 December 2000, Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) outlets in Makassar, South Sulawesi on 12 October 2001, Paddy's Pub and Sari Club in Kuta, Bali on 12 October 2002, JW Marriot Hotel, Kuningan, Jakarta on 5 August 2003, a

Café in Palopo, South Sulawesi on 10 January 2004, Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004, Immanuel Church, Palu, Central Sulawesi on 12 December 2004, R.AJ's Bar and Restaurant, Bali on 1 October 2005, traditional markets in Palu, Central Sulawesi on 31 December 2005, JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton Hotels, Jakarta on 17 July 2009 involving foreign terrorists including Dr. Azhari bin Husin, and Noordin Mohammed Top WN Malaysia and Muhammad Hassan Saynudin and Mas Slamet Kastari WN Singapore. The role of *Jamaah Islamiyah* increasingly receded due to disputes between its leaders which reached its lowest point with the resignation of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir on 19 July 2008 who then formed a new congregation with the name *Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid* (JAT) on 17 September 2008 (As'ad Said Ali, 2014 : 185-193). In 2013, a public dispute resulted in the split of the Al-Qaeda organization, which gave birth to the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In Indonesia, the existence of ISIS cannot be separated from the role of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the JAT leader who has pledged allegiance to ISIS, and Aman (Oman) Abdurrahman, who is said to be the leader of ISIS Nusantara and the founder of *Jamaah Ansharut Daulah* (JAD). There are at least seven pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia, namely *Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid* (JAT), East Indonesia *Mujahidin* (MIT), *Jamaah Tauhid wal Jihad*, Ring Banten, Gema Salam, West Indonesia *Mujahidin* (MIB), and the Islamic Sharia Activist Forum (FACTION) (Joshua Spooner, 2016:5). Meanwhile, the Sulu Islands and Mindanao Island in the Southern Philippines, which have a predominantly Muslim population living in poverty and geographical conditions that are difficult for the Philippine security forces to reach, have become JI bases with the support of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (Arifin Sudirman and Deasy Silvyia Sari, 2017: 2 and Peter Chalk, 2005: 152).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Intuitively, in the term terrorist target selection, terrorists always pay attention to geographical factors in selecting targets, including geographic factors (Eur, 2018, Hemmingby & Bjorgo, 2018); accounting for political, social, and religious factors (Perry & Berrebi 2013; Marchment & Gill, 2019); rationally and the choice takes into account ideology (Eur, 2018, Hemmingby & Bjorgo, 2018, Marchment & Gill, 2019); terrorist capabilities (Taylor, 2017); probability of attack success (risk with resulting number of victims) (Perry & Berrebi 2013); social ties and economic incentives (Fitriani, et. all, 2018).

Taylor (2017) further stated that it is not uncommon for terrorists to sacrifice themselves by carrying out suicide bombings or brutal attacks on targets. A study conducted by Eur (2018) in Istanbul found that terrorists and other criminals are concentrated by targeting certain targets and have similar patterns in other countries, namely location as target selection, while Bell (2017) is more specific, namely determining people as targets and subtargets. selection. Meanwhile, Zakiyah (2017) revealed that terrorist groups also spread radical ideology, build networks and recruit new members and prepare their actions using bombing mechanisms.

Terrorist attacks aim to inflict pain and influence foreign policy; damaging the economy, rallying support from the Muslim world (Libicki, Chalk & Sisson, 2017); changing government systems (Perry & Berrebi 2013; Marchment & Gill, 2019); and economic system (Fitriani, et. all, 2018). Terrorist figures from Indonesia returned from exile after the fall of the Soeharto regime (Zakiyah, 2016); One of these exiles was in Pakistan when Darul Islam (DI) leaders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir met with the Philippines Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) leader Salamat Hashim. This meeting encouraged the DI group to join the Philippines (Tito Karnavian, 2009: 117 and Daljit Singh, 2009: 84).

DISCUSSION

In its development, terrorist groups in the Philippines became increasingly divided, initially the MNLF was founded in 1972 and the MILF was founded in 1977 into several groups such as the ASG founded in 1991 which operates in the Tawi-Tawi Islands, Jolo Islands and Basilan Islands; Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) was founded in 2002 and operates in Central Luzon; Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) was founded in 2008 and operates in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; Maute Group was founded in 2012 operating in Lanao del Sur; Ansar al-Khalifah Philippines (AKP) was founded in 2014 and operates in Saranggani and South Cotabato, as JI experienced many setbacks. In 1991, Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani founded ASG which separated from the MNLF with the aim of establishing an Islamic state. On December 18 1998, Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani was killed and replaced by his younger brother Khadaffy Janjalani who began kidnapping foreign citizens (WN) and Filipino citizens to support his group. ASG began to change from a group that wanted to establish an Islamic state to a criminal group. On September 4 2006, Khadaffy Janjalani was killed so ASG lost central leadership so ASG was divided into two, namely ASG Jolo with the most senior figure Hasan Sawadjaan alias Hatib Sawadjaan who had become a kidnapping criminal group and ASG Basilan who still wanted to establish an Islamic state and was led by Furuji Indama after the death of Isnilon Hapilon in Marawi. Since August 31 2001, ASG Jolo has carried out kidnappings with ransom demands against citizens of the Philippines, the United States, Malaysia, Japan, Vietnam, the Netherlands, Germany, South Korea, France, Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Peru, India, China, Canada, Norway, Taiwan, and Italy (Banlaoi, 2007 and Rodell, 2007). On March 26 2016, ASG Jolo kidnapped 10 Indonesian crew members (ABK) from the tugboat TB Brahma 12 and the barge Anand 12

containing coal which was passing through the Tawi-Tawi Islands, Philippines. On May 1 2016, 10 Indonesian Indonesian hostages were released (bangsaonline.com, May 2 2016) but then this became the starting point for hostage taking of Indonesian crew members who were passing to the Tawi-Tawi Islands and Indonesian fishermen who were fishing in Sabah waters, Malaysia for a company owned by Malaysia which is still ongoing.

In November 2016 – January 2017, the leader of the ASG Basilan group who had declared himself the Amir of ISIS in Southeast Asia, Isnilon Hapilon, moved to Butiq, Lanao Del Sur, Mindanao Island (IPAC Report No. 38, 2017). ASG Basilan then joined the Maute Group, BIFF and AKP and took control of Marawi City on Mindanao Island, Philippines from 23 May – 23 October 2017 in order to establish an ISIS "wilayat" in Southeast Asia (Dancel, 24 October 2017). 17 members of the Tablighi Jamaah from Indonesia were trapped in two places in Marawi City and on June 1 2017 were successfully evacuated safely (ABS-CBN News, June 2 2017).

During the period from JI to ISIS, FTF from Southeast Asia was involved in acts of terrorism which resulted in many victims in the Philippines such as Dulmatin, Umar Patek, Ahmad Saifullah Ibrahim, Ahmad Faisal bin Imam Sarijan, Sanusi, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi (Indonesia), Zulkifli bin Abdul , Jeknal Adil, Amin Baco, Dr. Mahmud Ahmad, Muhammad Joraimie Awang Raimee, Mohd. Najib, Muamar Gadafi, Zulkifli Abdhir (Malaysia) and Muhammad Ali bin Abdul Rahiman alias Muawiyah (Singapore) (IPAC Report No. 33, 2016). Several Indonesian terrorists joined the MILF in carrying out bombings in the Philippines, including Hambali and Fathurrohman Al Ghozi who were involved in bombing 5 places in Manila, namely Ferguson Plaza, a petrol station, Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), a bus, and Blumentritt Train Station on December 30 2000 during the commemoration of the national hero Rizal Day (Rodell, 2007: 236)

and Taufiq Rifqi who was involved in the bombings in the Kidapawan area in January 2003, Tacurong in March 2003, Parang in April 2003 and Korodonal in February, March and May 2003 (HRW, 2007: 26).

Apart from committing acts of terrorism within the Philippines, Filipino terrorists are classified as foreign terrorist fighters who commit acts of terrorism abroad with the aim of, among other things, establishing their own state in the southern Philippines (Franco, 2017). Even though there is a connection between terrorists from Indonesia and terrorists from the Philippines, Filipino terrorists are not indicated to have carried out acts of terror in Indonesia as the target country. The leader of the Maute Group, Omarkhayam Maute, who controlled Marawi City for about 5 months, is the husband of Indonesian citizen (WNI) Minhati Madrais, who is known to have lived with Minhati Madrais' family and taught English at the Darul Amal Islamic Boarding School, Babelan, Bekasi Regency, owned by his father-in-law K.H. Madrais Azhar (IPAC: 14). In fact, the bombing of the Philippine Ambassador's House in Jakarta on August 1 2000 did not involve terrorists from the Philippines, but terrorists from Indonesia, namely Abdul Jabar bin Ahmad Kandai, Fatur Rahman Al-Ghozi alias Sa'ad and Edi Setiono alias Usman. The bombing resulted in 21 people being injured including Philippine Ambassador Leonides T. Caday. The bombing was a form of sympathy due to the destruction of Camp Abu Bakar as a joint training ground between Filipino and Indonesian terrorists (As'ad Said Ali, 2014: 251).

Mindanao has become a region with the emergence of terrorist groups that aim to establish their own state or are rebels and are closely related to conflicts in the Middle East such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), whose emergence reduces the role of previous, more moderate and nationalist groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) (Chaidar, et al, 2018). Katagiri (2019) through his research conducted a

comparison of organizational stability, deaths and target selection in the Abu Sayyaf Group which was considered an unstable rebel group and Jemaah Islamiyah as a stable rebel group. The conclusions of this research are based on data on JI and ASG activities between 1994 and 2015, namely 1) rebel groups that are organizationally unstable tend to see their members produce more victims, while stable groups often experience a reduction in violence; 2) organizational instability makes groups more likely to target civilian populations and business infrastructure rather than government, military and police forces, and transportation structures. In contrast, organizational stability has limited explanatory power in terms of its attack methods.

Abu Sayyaf, MILF and other movements want to establish an Islamic State (Mindanao Islamic State). This group recruits Islamic youths who are not in line with the MNLF group. The group's movement is based in Mindanao (Mears, 2017; Chaidar, 2018; The Asia Foundation & Rappler Inc. 2018); west of Mindanao, Basilan, Jolo and Sulu, namely in the south of the Philippines because the majority of Muslims inhabit this region (Ghofur, 2016); with the largest movement area Mindano (Banloi, 2014; Mears, 2017).

ASG attracts attention, especially to the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia because the territorial waters of these countries are the ASG group's operational areas. It is known that ASG pledged allegiance to Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi, who is the highest leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Kusuma, 2016). Philippine terrorists carry out their actions through two strategies, namely large-scale and small-scale wars in random locations so they tend to be difficult to predict (Wattimena, 2018). The ASG developed in the context of an unresolved ethnic conflict that broke away from the MNLF, fueled by corruption and political violence (Quimpo, 2017). The clear affiliation of these groups with issues outside Mindanao and the

Philippines signals a potential new era of conflict in the country (The Asia Foundation & Rappler Inc. 2018).

Following the defeat of ISIS in Syria, foreign terrorist fighters from the Philippines returned to their country and declared Mindanao as ISIS territory in Southeast Asia by recruiting other local fighters (Yaoren, 2019; Franco, 2017); while fighting in central Mindano, especially Lanao del Sur Province, included foreign jihadists (Franco, 2017).

Eminue & Ufomba, 2011 in their research expanded the boundaries of Power Transition Theory (Organski, 1958) by selecting targets for terrorist attacks on the components of national power. This model shows that terrorists aim to force countries to make concessions by determining their targets. The targets chosen greatly influence a country's national and international strength, namely its economy, political capacity and demographics. This is in line with the actions carried out by the Abu Sayyaf group at sea "Maritime Terrorists" (Asall & Hestings, 2014) with ship hijackings, including the hijacking of an Indonesian barge carrying coal when passing through Philippine waters. This is also supported by Morabito & Segi, (2018) who concluded that maritime piracy attacks are a serious threat to regional economic security, especially as Southeast Asia is the world's trade silk route.

The theoretical framework for the power transition theory model can be said to be in two interrelated dimensions - the international system and the domestic level. At the international level, one of the principles that distinguishes power transition theory from other theories of the international system is the proposition of a structured hierarchical system. The concept of the inverted pyramid adopted from Pammen shows an international system structured in four levels of power: dominant power; big power; medium strength; and little power. The position of countries in the pyramid is determined by their national

strength and influence within the system (Eminue & Ufomba, 2011; 377).

Based on the Global Terrorism Database dataset, Ahmed (2018) concluded six types of targets that terrorists consider when carrying out attacks, namely (a) political, (b) civilian, (c) security, (d) business, (e) rivals, and (f) infrastructure. The study found that there were differences in target selection based on ideology, and over time, all types of groups attacked civilian and security targets more frequently (Ahmed, 2018).

This target selection can be included in rational choice theory. Based on the perspective of rational choice theory, criminals tend to evaluate before committing by considering the probability of being discovered and caught, the effectiveness and impact of the punishment that may be imposed, the potential value of existing crime proceeds and their short-term needs for crime proceeds (Siegel, 2012: 106); strong interactions between ideologies (Fussey, 2011; Ahmed, 2018); motivation and operational choices, mitigating influences from outside (Fussey, 2011). Rational choice theory is based on the assumption that before choosing to commit a crime, the perpetrator considers personal or motivational, situational factors, such as risks and possible consequences (Cornish and Clarke, 1986), which makes the Philippines a base because it is difficult to reach by the Philippine security forces (Arifin Sudirman and Deasy Silvya Sari, 2017: 2 and Peter Chalk, 2005: 152). Ahmed (2018) emphasized that group types differ in their choice of modus operandi. According to the author, this is in line with the reason why the Philippine terrorist group was divided into several groups, namely MNLF, MILF, AKP, BIFF, and Maute but did not carry out kidnappings like those carried out by ASG.

From an economic perspective, the main threat to regional security in Southeast Asia is the relationship between maritime piracy and terrorism. Such an attack would halt international trade and cause economic losses. This is in line with what was

conveyed by Smith, who was the originator of rational choice, who stated that economic gain is the main trigger for someone to fight for that individual's life (Smith, 2007).

Rational Choice Theory with Terrorism Target Selection emphasizes the reasons for selecting targets by considering the level of success and the goal of the action being achieved. Meanwhile, Rorie (2008) found that attacking certain targets did not reduce the likelihood of attacks on other targets. Rorie proves that terrorists' choice of targets changes over time. Rorie's research can explain the change in ASG Jolo's modus operandi by carrying out kidnappings, especially of foreigners, for ransom to gain economic benefits.

Apart from rational choice and target selection, Pierre Bourdieu's Habitus Theory can explain that terrorism is not necessarily caused by economic class and ideological factors, but capital, habitus and field influence a person to commit a crime (Sageman, 2008; Basra & Neumann, 2016; Lakhani, 2018 in Ilan, J., & Sandberg, S. 2019) states that there is a relationship between crime and street culture and jihadism/terrorism. These largely marginalized individuals are some of the jihadists/terrorists who joined ISIS (Sageman, 2008; Nesser, 2015); those with broken homes (Walklate & Mythen, 2016); which Sageman later called the "third wave of jihadist terrorism". Street capital is a person's initial investment to commit a crime (Costa, Burke & Murphy, 2019); becoming a professional criminal which originates from a person's conative, cognitive and affective components (Mercan, 2018); also to terror groups (Ilan & Sanberg, 2019); who were recruited based on sociological similarities, which is the interaction of ideological and non-ideological actors (Kupatadze & Argomaniz, 2019).

Furthermore, Ilan & Sandberg stated that habitus supports continuity in attitudes and behavior in different violent contexts which shows that street social capital facilitates the recruitment of individuals into violent

jihadism. Ilan & Sandberg provide two case examples, namely that perpetrators who initially only committed street crimes in Europe became jihadists who joined ISIS. In the first case, there were 3 Norwegian citizens Sammiulla Khan, Abo Edelbijev and Torleif Angel Sanchez Hammer who initially went to Syria just to enjoy marijuana. The second case is Kuwaiti-born British citizen Mohammed Emwazi alias Jihadi John who was reported missing by his family in August 2013. Mohammed Emwazi was a young man who was socially marginalized as a teenager in England. A video on YouTube released on August 19 2014 shows Mohammed Emwazi with his head covered as the perpetrator of the beheading of American (WN) journalist James Foley. Mohammed Emwazi continued the beheadings uploaded on YouTube against US journalist Steven Sotloff on 2 September 2004, David Haines on 13 September 2014, British citizen volunteer Alan Henning on 3 October 2014, US citizen volunteer Abdul Rahman-Kassig alias Peter Kassig on November 15 2014, and Japanese citizen Kenji Goto on January 31 2015.

CONCLUSION

Acts of terrorism that occurred in Southeast Asia show that the perpetrators came from different countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, bound by similar ideologies. However, even though the acts of terrorism that occur only reflect the local interests of each terrorist's country of origin, Filipino terrorists have never carried out acts of terrorism in Indonesia, which shows that there are factors that influence Filipino terrorists. Data shows that the Philippine Terrorist group did not carry out any actions in Indonesia when the bombing occurred at the Philippine Embassy in Jakarta, except for the hijacking of ships and tugboats with Indonesian crew members in Philippine and Malaysian waters. Terrorist acts in Indonesia between 2000-2018 started with the bombing of the Philippine Embassy carried out by an

Indonesian terrorist group affiliated with Philippine terrorists. This indicates the truth that there is a relationship between Indonesian and Filipino terrorists which according to Karnavian (2009) and Singh (2009) there has been contact and cooperation with each other; Saad said at the trial in the Philippine Embassy bombing case that he carried out his action out of revenge for the burning of Abu Bakar Baasyir's camp in Mindanao. However, in carrying out their actions, Filipino terrorists have never been proven to have participated in their actions in Indonesia, which are different from actions in Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries.

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