

# Conceptual Problems of Political Parties Cadre Management in the Reform Era in Indonesia

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## ABSTRACT

This study describes the dynamics and practices of political party management in Indonesia after entering the reform era. The hopes for the welfare of the Indonesian people towards the existence of political parties in Indonesia have not shown significant results. Political parties are still trapped by internal interests compared to the big goal of improving the welfare of society, even the party's reputation in politics tends to decrease in society because of practices that violate the norms of decency. This study uses a qualitative method with a descriptive analysis approach

From the existing data, factual problems of political parties were found. The political party cadre system is unable to build cadre capacity, there is no capacity standardization in cadre recruitment, cadre capacity shifts to financial capacity, personal motivation is still unstable and always changes when cadres have occupied legislative positions and regional heads. The organizational climate of political parties is periodic, only before elections, there is no integrated teamwork in political parties, political work in political parties still depends on the interests of cadres. The leadership role in the lower regions is not able to translate the vision, mission and policy directives of the top level leaders, the top level leadership is unable to absorb aspirations and communication from the lower level leadership.

This research has a novelty that the management of political parties really needs the implementation of human capital. The human capital approach is currently still being applied to profit institutions and has never been tested in non-profit institutions, namely political party organizations.

**Keywords:** political parties, cadre governance, reformation era, human capital, leadership

## INTRODUCTION

The history of political parties in Indonesia is always interesting to study and observe. The existence and role of political parties in Indonesia have existed since the Dutch colonial era. At this writing, we will briefly discuss the journey of political parties in Indonesia from the Dutch colonial era to the present. This research emphasizes more on the role of human capital in a political party, so it does not explore too much about the history and progress of political parties. The history of political parties in Indonesia can be broadly divided into 3 periods. The three periods are during the colonial period, after Indonesian independence and the reform era.

The development of political party governance in Indonesia, especially during the reform era elections, political party organizations are still not organized in a modern way, and even tend to be managed in a traditional and personal way. The recruitment was dominated by party, family and dynasty strongmen. The filling of strategic positions in political parties is also inseparable from the influence of personification, dynasty (family), and people with money (businessmen). It is not surprising that the political candidacy process is thick with political transactions, political dowries, and overrides the integrity and political capacity factors of candidates. To a certain degree, the candidacy process is

constrained by party oligarchy which is increasingly centralized and not decentralized.

### **1. Colonial Period**

In 1908, an exclusive national movement organization for priyayi named Boedi Oetomo was established. This organization later became the embryo of other organizational movements. This led to the emergence of other independent organizations. The first modern party that explicitly fought for the Indies for the Indians was the Indische Partij organization (December 1912). After that other political parties were established such as ISDV (Indische Social Democratische Vereniging) in May 1914, Indische Katholike Partij in November 1918, PKI (May 1920), PNI (July 1924), Indonesian People's Party (September 1930), Parindra (January 1931), the Indonesian Party (April 1931), and Gerindo (May 1937). The organization comes from various ideologies such as Islam, secular, nationalist, and communist.

In 1939, the Netherlands formed a people's council (Volksraad) which is a body like the DPR. Therefore, that year in the Dutch East Indies there were already several factions, namely the National Fraction under the leadership of M. Husni Thamim, the Association of Bestuur Bumi-Putera Employees (PPBB) under Prawoto, and the Indonesische Nationale Group under the leadership of Muhammad Yamin. There is an attempt to rely on a combination of political parties outside the Volksraad and make it a kind of national representative council called the Indonesian People's Committee (K.R.I). There is the Indonesian Political Association (GAPI), the Indonesian A'laa Islamic Council (MIAI), and the Indonesian People's Council (MRI) within the K.R.I.

In contrast to the Dutch colonial period, while the Japanese were in power in Indonesia, the activities of political parties were prohibited. However, this does not apply to Islamic groups that form the

Indonesian Muslim Syuro Council Party (MASYUMI).

### **2. The Post-Independence Period**

In the post-independence period, Moh. Hatta as the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia issued the Declaration No. X dated October 16, 1945. This caused many parties to emerge in Indonesia. This is the first party multisystem in Indonesia after the proclamation of Indonesian independence.

The parliamentary period was rife in Indonesia in 1950-1959 which was the heyday of political parties in Indonesia. Four major parties emerged, namely the PNI (Indonesian National Party), NU, Masyumi and the PKI, but the cabinet did not run smoothly because there were many political parties during the parliamentary period. Frequently changing cabinets and failed developments led to the issuance of a presidential decree on 5 July 1959 declaring the end of the parliamentary period in Indonesia. This Presidential Decree is a way out of the Constituent Assembly's crisis which failed to reach an agreement on the basis of the State.

The Constituent Assembly was the result of the 1955 election which gave birth to an ideological configuration between supporters of Pancasila as the basis of the state and Islam as the basis of the state. There are 544 members of the Constituent Assembly from 34 political parties. Pancasila supporters numbered 274, Muslims 230, and socio-economic ideological supporters 10. Apart from being a response to the failure of the Constituent Assembly, this Decree also reflected widespread disillusionment with the behavior of political parties during the Liberal Democracy period (1945-1957). After the Decree, President Soekarno began to take important steps towards the arrangement of political parties until the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 7 of 1959 concerning party terms and simplification.

This was also followed by the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 13 which regulates

the recognition, supervision, and dissolution of several parties. Due to the involvement of a number of key figures in the formation of PRRI/Permesta, PSI and Masyumi were disbanded through Presidential Decree 128/61. Recognition was given to political parties namely PNI, NU, Catholic Party, Indonesian Party, Murba, PSII, IP-KI, and PKI. Parkindo and Perti are recognized through Presidential Decree 440/61. Through Presidential Decree 129/61 the Abikusno PSSI party, Daeng Lalo's Free National People's Party, and Djodi Gondokusomo's National People's Party were not recognized. On April 14, 1961 the government issued an announcement that only recognized 10 political parties. The ten political parties are PNI, NU, PKI, PSII, Parkindo, Catholic Party, Perti, Murba, and IPKI.

Only the PKI could effectively carry out its function as a political party during this period because it was used by Soekarno as a balancing force for the Army which had become the main political force. Various problems occurred so that Soekarno dissolved parliament on March 5, 1960 due to parliament's rejection of the government's proposed budget plan. Subsequently, the DPR-GR was formed in July 1960 despite the opposition from a number of political parties and figures who founded the "democratic league". The Democracy League consists of the Catholic Party, Masyumi, PSI, and IPKI which has the support of the Indonesian Army, Moh. Hatta, and a number of PNI and NU figures. DPR-GR has 263 members, of which 132 come from functional groups (7 representatives of the Army, 7 representatives of the Air Force and Navy, 5 police and the rest are from organizations such as SOBSI, Gerwani, BTI, SARPUBRI, Pemuda Rakyat, and so on

The end of the parliamentary period in Indonesia marked the start of a new system in this country, namely the period of guided democracy. This period was a period when the president was very strong as evidenced by the slogan NASAKOM-ya. Soekarno

strengthened three parties namely NU, PNI, and PKI as the core of the slogan. The PKI at that time was the most prominent because it controlled the majority of the votes of the Indonesian people. However, after the G30S/PKI incident, the PKI was labeled as a banned party because it tried to take over the government. The PKI coup was suppressed by Suharto, who at that time received a mandate in the form of Supersemar to crush the PKI and its cronies. The New Order period was marked by Suharto replacing Sukarno as President of the Republic of Indonesia. During the New Order era, a non-party organization called Golongan Karya appeared. Golkar won the most votes beating NU, Parmusi and PNI in the 1971 election. In 1973, Indonesia began to simplify political parties into three, namely two political parties and one group. The nationalist party and several non-Islamic parties namely PNI, IPKI, Murba, Parkindo, and the Catholic Party merged into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) on January 10, 1973.

Political parties with Islamic ideology, namely NU, PARMUSI, PSII, and PERTI were merged into the United Development Party (PPP) on January 5, 1973. One non-party group was Golkar which was Suharto's supporter in controlling Indonesia. Two political parties and working groups followed the history of elections in Indonesia in 1977, 1992, 1987, 1992 and 1997. The New Order regime ended with the resignation of President Suharto on May 21, 1998 because he was suspected of having committed a lot of collusion, corruption and nepotism (KKN).

### **3. Reformation Period**

After the Suharto regime was successfully overthrown, elections with a multi-party system took place again in Indonesia. Since 2004 until now, general election participants have appeared unstoppable. This phenomenon is a picture of the euphoria of Indonesian democracy which was once very restrained, but then just let go.

In addition to the large number of political parties participating in the election, the most notable change is the large role of political parties in government. The existence of political parties is very closely related to the work of political elites, mobilizing political masses, and increasingly crystallized competition for political resources. The existence of the essence of reform in Indonesia is the skillful participation of full power, namely the power of society which is channelled through political parties as a pillar of democracy.

This led to the emergence of Law no. 2 of 1999 which was further refined by Law no. 31 of 2002 which allows the birth of new parties in Indonesia. However, of the many parties that emerged in the reform era, only 5 parties won significant votes, namely the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the United Development Party (PPP), the Golkar Party, the National Awakening Party, and the National Mandate Party (PAN).

The presence of many parties is expected to be a forum for the community to actively participate in the progress of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Article 1 paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution contains that sovereignty is in the hands of the people and implemented according to the Constitution. This means that people's sovereignty is no longer fully implemented by the MPR, but implemented according to the provisions of Law no. 23. Law no. 23 of 2003 concerning Direct Presidential Election was drafted to follow up on Article 1 Paragraph 2 of the Amendments to the 1945 Constitution. In its explanation it is explained that one form of people's sovereignty is the holding of general elections both to elect members of the DPR, DPD and DPRD as well as to elect the President and Vice President who all implemented according to the Law as the embodiment of a legal state within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

The direct election of the President and Vice President is stated in Article 6A of the 1945

Constitution, namely "The President and Vice President are directly elected as a pair by the people, and the pairs of candidates for President and Vice President are proposed by political parties, a combination of political parties participating in the General Election, prior to the implementation of the Election." General". The election of the President and Vice President is carried out every 5 years through elections that are carried out in a LUBER and JUDIL (Direct, General, Free, Confidential and Honest and Fair) manner carried out by the National Election Commission which is national, permanent and independent.

#### **4. Transformation of Post-Reform Political Parties**

Post-reformation political life continues to undergo transformation. Freedom of opinion is considered to be the main characteristic of transformation. The problem of the declining number of people's political participation in the post-reform era can be seen from two perspectives. First, this phenomenon can be read as an indication that the Indonesian people do not have a deep understanding of the importance of exercising their political rights. This is a serious problem that can hinder efforts to realize the administration of the state for the benefit of the people, where public participation is an absolute necessity. Second, low public political participation can actually come from high political participation. However, political participation does not go hand in hand with trust in the government. Both the policies resulting from government leaders who, after being elected from the political process, have disappointed the public a lot, to the legal cases that ensnared them when they served in government. This problem ultimately gave birth to political cynicism which led to low levels of political participation.

The results of the Kompas Research and Development survey on December 20-22 2022 show that the majority of the public,

namely 78.2 percent of respondents, are not interested in becoming candidates for legislative members (caleg) from political parties. Based on the survey, only 20.5 percent of the public said they were interested in becoming people's representatives, while 1.3 percent said they did not know. Quoted from Kompas.id news, there were a number of reasons given by the respondents why they wanted or did not want to become candidates. As many as 55.2 percent of the respondents who said they did not want to become candidates reasoned that they would rather be ordinary people, while 25.2 percent another percent felt insecure or had no political experience. There are several other reasons why someone does not want to become a candidate for legislative, including, political parties have a bad image (6.7 percent), are afraid of stumbling into legal cases (3.7 percent), are prohibited by their families (2.6 percent), and do not have capital ( 2.0 percent). Meanwhile, 45.1 percent of respondents who wanted to become legislative candidates reasoned that they wanted to serve the people. Nevertheless, pragmatic reasons were also expressed by those who wanted to run as candidates, for example looking for a job (24.9 percent), wanting to be more prosperous economically (18.6 percent), and wanting to become a politician (9.5 percent). In addition, there are also 1.5 percent of respondents who want to become candidates because they want to build a business network and 0.4 percent who want to have more authority.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **Political Parties**

There are many definitions of political parties made by political experts. Two opinions were taken from Budiardjo [2], namely: "among other things according to Carl J. Friedrich, a political party is a group of people who are organized stably to seize or maintain control of the government for their party leaders and based on this control, giving their party members benefits that are

ideal and material. Meanwhile, according to Sigmund Neumann, political parties are organizations of political activists who seek to control government power and win people's support through competition with a group or other groups that have different views.

In a vast and complex modern society, many different opinions and aspirations develop. The opinions or aspirations of a person or a group will disappear without a trace if they are not accommodated and combined with the opinions and aspirations of other similar people. The existence of political parties, according to Budiardjo, functions to a) formulation of public interests (interest articulation), b). Aggregation and articulation are one of the communication functions of political parties, c) Fighting for or conveying people's aspirations through parliament to the government to make it into public policy, d) As a liaison in the form of discussing and disseminating government plans and policies. This political party carries out the function of two-way dialogue communication, from top to bottom and from bottom to top, and e) Educating its members to become human beings who are aware of their responsibilities as citizens and place their interests below national interests.

Political parties are organizations of like-minded people who strive to achieve political power and public office to implement their policies [3]. Roberts Michels in 1911 in the book "Political Parties" argued that political parties have always been and will always be run by minority groups. The basic principles of political parties are political parties as coalitions, political parties as organizations, and political parties as policymakers. Of these three basic principles, political parties are divided into movement political parties and pressure group political parties. [4] Roy C, Macridis writes that political parties in a country are classified based on the number of political parties: one party, two parties, or multi-party, then based on their characteristics: competitive, aggregative,

ideological, pluralist, monopolistic, issue-oriented or follower-oriented or support sources international organization.[5]

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, a political party in the modern sense can be defined as a group that proposes candidates for public office to be elected by the people so they can control or influence government actions. Meanwhile, according to Mark N. Nagopian, a political party is an organization formed to influence the shape and character of public policy within the framework of certain ideological principles and interests through the practice of direct power or people's participation in elections. The Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 2 of 2011 concerning Political Parties says: "Political parties are organizations that are national and were voluntarily formed by a group of Indonesian citizens based on the common will and aspirations to fight for and defend the political interests of members, society, nation, and state, as well as maintaining the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Every political party has the right to carry out political education to recruit, prepare and promote for political needs."

## **MATERIALS & METHODS**

This study uses a qualitative method with a descriptive analysis approach.

## **RESULT**

### **The Practice of Political Parties in the Reform Era**

During the New Order era, the role of political parties was only limited to complementing democracy and the legitimacy of power. The Karya Group (Golkar) was deliberately designed to have a central role in government and power compared to the other two contestants. The collapse of the New Order regime provided an opportunity for political parties to reappear as quality political parties and elections. Political parties have played a very important role since the 1998 reform

with the issuance of Law No. 02 of 1999 concerning Political Parties.

The product of the policy on political parties after the reformation was in the form of significant changes to the representation system, the establishment of political parties and the mechanism for electing the president/regions. The reform order in 1998 was a turning point for democracy. Amendments to the 1945 Constitution which were considered 'sacred' by the New Order, can now be amended through the MPR. The 1945 Constitution was amended four times. This shows that there is a change in paradigm and state order in the political system in Indonesia. Likewise, reforms occurred in state legal institutions with the birth of the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Commission.

Democracy requires the existence of political parties, therefore modern democracy cannot exist without political parties. Political parties play an important role in a democratic government system in encouraging citizens to actively participate in politics and elections for public office. This statement reinforces that political parties must have a good cadre governance design to prepare political party cadres to manage power. It is not the 'karbitan' cadres who often appear in every election contestation, because political parties do not have popular and qualified cadres to compete with.

The Corruption Eradication Commission shows that more than 51 percent of politicians who are caught in corruption are young politicians, politicians under the age of 50. A number of studies on election corruption also state that parties are starting to "not be trusted by the public," political parties also practice deviant politics such as money politics, political transactions, and bribery.

The Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) report states that political parties are also considered to be rife in electoral corruption in the form of vote buying such as giving money and goods, providing services, and also creating vote brokers through a number

of actors and agencies that function as political brokers. In terms of actors, the perpetrators of electoral corruption are also not single, including candidates such as candidates for members of the DPR, candidates for regional heads, campaign teams and party officials, as well as political party cadres.

system of political parties that is unable to build cadre capacity in the absence of capacity standardization in the cadre recruitment process. Starting to shift the quality of cadre capacity from competence and integrity capacity to financial capacity is the main cause of internal problems in political parties. The personal motivation of cadres is still unstable and always changing when political party cadres have occupied legislative and regional head positions.

### 1. Contemporary Conceptual Problems of Political Parties

A contemporary conceptual problem that arises in political parties is the regeneration

Conceptual Problems	Identification of Factual Problems
The system of regeneration of political parties is not able to build the capacity of cadres There is no capacity standardization in the recruitment of cadres Regeneration capacity shifts to financial capacity	The stock of cadres is inadequate and not competitive so political parties open recruitment to the public Open recruitment of cadres for legislative candidates and regional head candidates without any selection and strict criteria Open cadre recruitment orientation to increase popularity and electability The capacity of caleg and cakada is measured by how much the economy is able to finance the operational costs of political parties. The phenomenon of political dowry emerged amid a crisis of regeneration of political parties.
Personal motivation is still unstable and always changing when cadres have occupied legislative and regional head positions	Weakened control of the political party structure over cadres who have strategic positions on regional heads and the legislature. The phenomenon of communication barriers between party structures and legislative officials and regional heads The vision and mission of legislative officials and regional heads are not aligned with the vision and mission of the political party structure. The phenomenon of 'jumping fleas' cadres moves to political parties that have a chance of winning big elections.
The organizational climate of political parties is periodic only before elections	Work orientation of the dominant political party in winning elections Political education programs are not working properly. The work of political parties is only visible just before the election.
There is no integrated teamwork in political parties Political work in political parties still depends on the interests of cadres	Open election contestation increases competition not only between parties but also within parties. Each Legislative candidate and Regional head candidate compete to prioritize their own victory, not the party's victory. Political party internal conflicts arise when each cadre has a slice of the same political mass base and party political machine. Unequal distribution of resources and support from political party structures to cadres as Legislative candidate and Regional head candidate causing internal friction.
The leadership role in the lower regions is not able to translate the vision, mission and policy directives of the top level leaders Top level leadership is unable to absorb aspirations and communications from lower level leadership.	Recruitment of open leadership cadres is not based on competency but only considerations of economic strength and power, resulting in weak leadership qualities in the eyes of the political party structure and cadres at lower levels. Expensive political costs encourage aleg and sometimes have personal agendas that are not aligned with the structure of political parties The elitist leadership style does not accommodate suggestions and input from cadres at lower levels

Organizationally, the organizational climate of political parties is periodic, only before elections, programs and work systems are not carried out continuously and continuously. Political parties do not have integrated teamwork, political work in political parties depends on the interests of a cadre as a member of the legislature or regional head. The conceptual problem at

the leadership level is that the leadership role in the lower regions is not able to translate the vision, mission and policy direction of the top leadership in a systematic, effective and applicable manner. In contrast, top-level leadership is unable to strategically absorb all aspirations and communications from lower-level leadership.

## **2. Golongan Putih (Golput)**

### **Phenomenon (people who do not vote in elections)**

The term White People (Golput) first appeared in the General Election of 1971. Golput is a term given to people who did not vote in the Election in Indonesia. The Golput phenomenon is translated and developed into a broken voice and all those who did not come to cast their vote in the Election, because of political disapproval, or because they were not registered as voters or for other reasons. The Golput phenomenon is also a reflection of the political culture of individuals participating in political activities.

One of the reasons people don't come to the polling booth is because they don't know any of the candidates who will be elected. It shows the failure of political campaigns and political socialization in general elections by candidates, campaigners or political parties. People who deliberately do not want to come to vote in the general election is a "political action" or "political behavior". It can also be called as one form of political participation or political culture of the people. The people who deliberately did not participate in giving their vote in the general election show that the campaign as a political agenda of the general election is not able to influence potential voters.

Abstentions in every general election in Indonesia have relatively the same characteristics, which are a form of apathy and criticism among prospective voters and at the same time can be a form of protest against the ruling regime. In fact, [1], also includes Abstentions into the group "participation in protest activities" or "critical participation". Whereas [10], stated that groups (abstentions) are basically the same as people who take part in demonstrations, sign petitions, or carry out boycotts that are developing in various democratic countries.

The phenomenon of Abstentions is also a reflection of individual political culture in

participating in political activities. A person's attitude to participate whether active, passive, or critical in general elections is inseparable from his political culture. Thus, the capability and responsiveness of a person or group to a political system is shown or reflected by the political culture they adhere to. Political culture is very important, because it is able to influence one's politics in a democratic country, so it is necessary to develop certain values and orientations that support it, such as: moderation, tolerance, civility, efficiency, intelligence and participation. [6], understand political culture based on three individual political orientations, namely: (1) cognitive orientation, (2) affective orientation, and (3) evaluation orientation. The political culture then influences the political awareness of individuals to participate in general elections. Participation, which is a basic element in representative democracy, means the involvement of all citizens who have the right to vote in general elections. In fact, the phenomenon of Abstentions, which is large in number, is a problem in the quality of general elections and representative democracy, because it will increase the occurrence of disconnections or gaps between the electorate and the elected representatives of the people (disconnect electoral).

The occurrence of this electoral disconnect is proven in Indonesia by the results of a survey conducted by Formappi (Indonesian Parliamentary Community Concerned Forum;) on 13 January - 7 February 2011 using a random sampling method. Formappi found that the people felt they were not represented by members of parliament (the People's Representative Council). In fact, the majority of respondents did not know the members of parliament who represented them (Kompas, 22-3-2011). There were 71% of respondents who did not support certain political parties, and of that number there were 93% who did not vote (Golput) in the 2009 general election. Of the 14% of respondents who supported certain political



parties, they mentioned the name of the political party they supported, but 72% do not know the person who represents them, and even 96% feel they are not represented by members of parliament. Even though the existing data has been researched for a long time, it is still relevant to the current political process.

The phenomenon mentioned above is very interesting, because the disconnection between representatives and being represented (disconnect electoral) at the same time gives rise to "distrust" from the people (voters) which will encourage the birth of "hard-headed" attitudes and politics to become Abstentions (not participating in the election). elections) and do not want to be involved in other political participation. This electoral discrepancy (disconnect electoral) will continue to occur in Indonesia, because both representatives and being represented are both infected by politics and a political culture of ignorance or apathy. It is undeniable that the voters who carry out Abstentions belong to this apathetic political group. Even today the phenomenon of Abstentions reappears in the form of 'defenders' [9], or rejection of the policies of the ruling regime

Academically, it can be stated that the Abstentions phenomenon also easily arises, because prospective voters come to the ballot box to cast their vote in general elections, it is a right and not an obligation (compulsory). As a right, of course it may be used, but it may also not be utilized in general elections, so participating in voting is optional or optional. It can also mean that participating in elections is a personal

matter even though it concerns state affairs, which is known as civic privatism [11], Precisely when a person casts his vote in a voting booth freely, directly and secretly, it is entirely a personal matter. Based on this, political participation in general elections is indeed voluntary. This voluntary nature requires that politicians or candidates must be able to "persuade" the people through effective informative, educative and persuasive campaigns.

Politicians as political communicators are required to build an image and form positive public opinion for him so that people voluntarily come to the voting booths and give their votes to their candidates or political parties. Likewise, electoral disparities (electoral disconnect) must be eliminated by establishing direct communication between the politicians who represent them and the people they represent. The history of general elections in Indonesia shows that according to statistics, the number of Abstentions is still low compared to other countries. This means that the level of political participation in general elections (turn out) in Indonesia is still relatively high, because the average is still above 60%. Even during the New Order (elections of 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997) the political participation rate in general elections reached almost 90%. The highest percentage during the 1955-2009 election was the 1971 general election (93.66%), and the lowest was the 2009 general election (61.78%). This shows that the highest number of Abstentions so far was in the 2009 general election, namely 39.22%.



Figure 1. Number of Whites in Indonesia during elections

It turns out that the number of Abstentions in post-New Order general elections has shown a significant increase. The increase in the number of Abstentions also occurred in post-conflict local elections (general elections for regional heads). In fact, in several post-conflict local elections, Abstentions actually won, in the sense that the number of Abstentions votes was greater than all the candidates. Likewise in the 2009 general election, Abstentions emerged as the winner, because of the 171,265,442 registered as 'permanent voters', only 121,288,366 exercised their right to vote. Thus, there were 49,677,076 voters who did not vote.

Only 104,099,785 valid votes and 17,488,581 invalid votes. This shows that the total number of Abstentions votes could be 167,165,657 (49,677,076 +17,488,581), much larger than the votes of the Democratic Party which won the 2009 general election, namely 21,703,137 (20.85%). Likewise in the 2014 general election, it turned out that the vote for Golput (24.89% or 60,809,764) was also bigger than the vote for the PDI Perjuangan (18, 95% or 23,681,471) which won the election. Legitimate votes in the 2014 election were 124,972,491 out of 185,882,225 in the DPT (Fixed Voter List).

#### [8]

The tendency for the number of Abstentions to increase has raised concerns because of the possibility that in the 2019 election the number of Abstentions will increase again. This is in line with the increasing "disillusionment" of many groups towards "reform" and democracy which are increasingly far from expectations. This concern and disappointment has spread because the arrival of many citizens to the voting booths has been mobilized by the candidates through their campaign teams, by means of intimidation and/or giving gifts of t-shirts, sarongs, koko clothes, groceries, and other forms or transportation money. This can be categorized as a form of "money politics" which occurs mainly in "black

market politics", making it difficult to prove legally.

A number of observers, experts or academics have concluded that in the general elections during the reformation period in Indonesia, political behavior of "material transactions" has developed rapidly which has come to be known as "transactional politics". This creates a broad and complex political impact which at the same time greatly worsens the image of democracy. This happened because political campaigns, political socialization, and political communication did not run as they should, resulting in "instant political behavior" in general elections. Instant political behavior and political transactions in the "political black market", then also gave birth to electoral disparities (disconnect electoral) because for politicians people's affairs have been completed after being given a "gift".

Voters are also of the view that if a candidate is later elected then he will gain respect and material benefits, so that voters also deserve material benefits when choosing a candidate. The behavior of "transactional politics", has made the image of democracy even worse and has even begun to be "hated" by intellectuals, scholars, religious leaders and other idealists. The warriors of democracy must fight hard, so that "transactional politics" is eliminated, especially in general elections.

Abstentions are a challenge that must be suppressed in order to increase participation through political education, accommodation of regulations and improvement of data administration. The specific approach is important to differentiate according to the roots of the Abstentions above. The emphasis on the number of Abstentions should also be prioritized through political education that can be carried out for Abstentions perpetrators because of political illiteracy and idealism. Politically illiterate people can be educated about the urgency of politics for nation-building. This understanding is also important to instill that all residents have an interest in politics

because all state affairs are carried out through political policies.

Politically illiterate people can be encouraged to actively provide aspirations so that their interests are politically accommodated. In order to eliminate "transactional politics" and at the same time reduce the number of Abstentions, it is necessary to socialize and political education as well as intensive and effective political communication, through political marketing or political public relations over a long period of time. It must be realized that in a healthy political image nothing is instantaneous or arbitrary, because it has to go through a long process.

### **3. Political Dynasty and Oligarchy Vortex**

Elections are an event to involve the people directly to determine who will become the regional leader and even the country. The issue of leadership that develops in politics is always considered interesting, one of these issues is political dynasties. The phenomenon of leadership that is passed down from generation to generation within the immediate family is a discussion that never goes out. The phenomenon of political dynasties often appears in national and local politics, which tends to trap, create conflict and interfere with the consolidation of democracy.

The presence of dynastic politics is inseparable from the participation of political parties and local government. Candidates nominated by political parties do not consider the credibility and quality of the candidates, but are based more on the wishes of the party elite in the struggle for power. This political dynasty builds its power network by continuously trying to dominate and kill democracy. Elite groups are groups that have the ability to influence the political decision-making process, so that they can easily reach power or fight for power.

The elites try to maintain their power by appointing family members to replace their position as leaders. The lack of strong existing regulations has led to the rampant politics of this dynasty, so many things can happen if dynastic politics is not weakened. The consequences that occur, for example, are the weakening of the function of legal control, especially regarding acts of corruption committed by officials and their relatives.

Indonesia as a democratic country should be able to be as open about democratic politics as possible to ensure that its people are actively involved in the political process. However, in reality, with the emergence of dynastic politics, obstacles arose in community participation because of their social status or rights, which differed greatly from those of the incumbent's family.

Leadership in dynastic politics is leadership that is passed on to children, wives, or close relatives. Dynastic politics can give rise to injustice, corruption, collusion and nepotism. In fact, in the current era, leaders who are competent, honest, and considerate of the voice of the people are urgently needed, not holding office only for personal and group interests. Interestingly, dynastic politics is like a fungus that lives in a damp room, thrives, takes root and is difficult to eradicate.

The phenomenon of political dynasties is supported by weak legal regulations. This dynastic politics makes incompetent people have power, whereas competent people don't even have power on the grounds that they are not part of the family. In this case dynastic politics is contrary to the democratic system implemented in Indonesia and the fifth precept of Pancasila which reads "justice for all Indonesian people".

Political dynasty is a system that creates or develops power by relying on familial or kinship relations. This shows that close

relatives or family members are used as a tool as a supporting factor for the creation of a strong and lasting power. Political dynasties can be called a system that is contrary to democracy because it has limited the scope of democracy which should open up the widest possible opportunities in politics.

This phenomenon has existed since ancient times in the days of kingdoms that grew and developed in the archipelago (Indonesia). Even today, political dynasties are still very strong. Both in terms of his conception as a political actor, political strategy, political orientation, and then it becomes a political culture that continues to grow and develop in the midst of Indonesian society. Basically, in democracy there are no political dynasties, although many historical records in modern democratic countries must have found political dynasties.

Yet, as we know, a democratic country upholds the right of all citizens to vote and be elected. The facts on the ground show that political dynasties are developing within the scope of our democracy, what is happening is based on personal and familial closeness, not based on the quality of candidates. Political dynasties in Indonesia have emerged and developed since the old order. Political dynasties in the local sphere have emerged since the first regional elections were held in 2005 as well as through the implementation of regional autonomy in 2001. As this process progresses as a form of local democratization, various regional elites emerged to co-opt the two processes.

The emergence of these elites is known as the reorganization of power. This reorganization is interpreted as a return to the influence of local elite political power in the era of democracy. During the New Order era, the power of the elites was limited by the center, the mechanism tended to be direct appointments. Local elites who were

pro-New Order had privileges, while those who were against the New Order leadership could be eliminated from the local political arena in their area.

The momentum of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy was marked by the regional autonomy policy which was greatly utilized by the two groups, the pro and contra groups against the new order for full power in their regions in the contestation to become the winning elite as well as in synergy with each other which were generally united through marriage. The development of political dynasties at the local level can also be interpreted in terms of local 'Cendanaization'. The term sandalwood refers to the Cendana Family during the 32 years under the leadership of President Soeharto, who was very powerful in Indonesia's political economy. Starting from children, in-laws, nephews, to other relatives occupying strategic government posts so that the Cendana Family dynasty ruled for 3 decades of government.

In Indonesia, political dynasties are usually carried out in two ways, namely by design and by accident. Political dynasties by design have been formed for a long time where relationally, the network of familism in government is already strong, so that relatives who enter the government or enter into political contestation have been arranged in such a way and have been designed from the start to occupy certain posts. The dominant model by design is that the wife replaces the husband or the child replaces the father. The political dynasty by accident itself occurs in a government situation that suddenly nominates relatives to replace it in order to maintain informal power over the successor if it wins in a political contest.

Meanwhile, the by accident model usually involves relatives as regional head candidates only as a shadow over other relatives who are favored to win the

regional head election. The phenomenon of political dynasties in Indonesia can be seen since Bung Karno came to power. Soekarno's descendants continued their profession as politicians: Megawati Soekarnoputri, Sukmawati, and Guruh Soekarno. The phenomenon of political dynasty can also be seen in Gusdur's family (K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid), namely the involvement of his siblings and his own children in politics.

Likewise Megawati Soekarnoputri who showed signs of a political dynasty with Puan Maharani's active involvement in Indonesian politics and eventually became chairman of the People's Representative Council. At first, there was optimism that this disease would disappear with the election of Jokowi as President because he did not come from an elite political family. However, this assumption turned out to be wrong, as Jokowi's online media timeline has blessed his son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, to become a candidate for mayor of Solo.

Not only his son, Jokowi's son-in-law, Bobby Nasution, is also running as a candidate for mayor of Medan. In Solo, Gibran and his partner, Teguh Prakosa, won a landslide victory by winning more than 90% of the votes for the independent candidate Bagyo Wahyono-FX Supardjo. Bobby and Aulia Rachman also won the victory. They won 53.45% of the vote, while their opponents, namely Akhyar Nasution-Salman Alfarisi, only received 46.55% of the vote. Even Siti Nur Azizah, the daughter of the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia for 2019-2020, Ma'ruf Amin, is running for the 2020 South Tangerang Mayor election.

Political dynasties have the potential to be strong enough to foster a corrupt culture in government. With various examples of political dynasties that have occurred in Indonesia, the public's anxiety has been

captured by the government by banning political dynasties from taking part in the elections again. In Article 7 letter r of Law No. 8 of 2015 concerning Regional Elections it is stated that "does not have a conflict of interest with the incumbent" What is meant by not having the incumbent's interests means not having blood relations, marital ties and/or lineage at a straight level up, down, sideways with the incumbent, namely father, mother, in-laws, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, in-laws, children, in-laws unless they have passed 1 term of office.

#### **4. Money Politics and Democratic Party Cheating**

Political parties experience deep disconnection of ideological relations with many voters so that money becomes an important factor to regain support. It is this pragmatic interaction that has lately become the ugly face of democratic practices in Indonesia. Constitutional reform succeeded in creating a political democratization process in which the pendulum of power was no longer solely monopolized by the state. The New Order-style repressive and totalitarian state which was so dominant in all the management and distribution of political power/resources fell into a democratic era in which there was increased control and public participation.

The manifestation of this democratic model in its journey can be found one of them by holding the election process for government officials (President, Regional Head, Members of the Legislature). Elections are the main essence of the ongoing modern democracy [10], The goal is to seek political representation that is more substantive and responsible. This type works in a democratic arena where elected leaders work to truly represent the interests of their people.

In a democratic regime there is an obligation to circulate the change of leaders

through an accountable and transparent process. Theoretically, the process of democratization, which is a phase of transformation from authoritarianism to democracy, will take place perfectly if there is a quality election process that produces political leaders who are pro-public welfare. This is a very difficult hope considering that democratization in countries in this phase usually requires a fairly long process of improvement, especially to fight corruption [7]

In the political transition phase, a minimum of 3 general elections is needed to obtain the ideal democratic quality (Huntington, 1984). Huntington's thesis is actually targeting the process of democratization in the third world after authoritarian regimes which if carried out according to procedures and ethics will produce a government based on good governance, increased and strong community participation and an accountable party system. The next election will become a strategic arena to see how far the process of consolidating democracy has been successful, especially in Indonesia. In the Indonesian political landscape, after the New Order it was recorded that 5 (five) general elections had been held, namely 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019.

As for the Regional Head Election (Pilkada) it has been going on for 13 years (2005) with various kinds of achievements and problems. As we all know, this costly process of political contestation has not been able to answer the aspirations of reform and the public's expectation of getting political leaders who are oriented towards public welfare agendas. This stagnation of hope is commonplace considering that the election process that we are undergoing is loaded with a myriad of problems. Starting from vote manipulation, money politics, social conflict, intimidation and violence. This anomaly shows that the election/pilkada process has not been

properly institutionalized, so it is difficult to expect the output of political leadership with a vision of social justice.

This study focuses on photographing the phenomenon of money politics as a negative consequence of general elections in Indonesia. Money politics is actually a continuation of the political pragmatism of Indonesian society which has continued to develop after the 1998 political reform. On the one hand, the opening of faucets for political participation, apart from providing fresh air for public involvement in the political process, also has an effect on the formation of pragmatic voters who are ideologically affiliated in the floating mass category.

Voters in this category do not have rigid political preferences, are prone to change and can often be mobilized with money. Money politics has in turn transformed into one of the pathologies of electoral democracy in Indonesia. Work effectively in a psychological atmosphere of voters who do not yet have critical literacy in voting.

Political preferences that are not based on rationality result in political choices being often based on short-term considerations, one of which is money. Research findings from the Politics and Government Research Center (PolGov) UGM Yogyakarta in collaboration with the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University (ANU) conclude that Indonesian politics is [6], The above thesis is indeed quite valid considering that our electoral moment is in fact thick with money politics.

From 1999-2019 political cases were recorded in the Indonesian elections, if accumulated, they reached 669 cases. Even in the Pilkada by taking samples of the 2015 and 2017 simultaneous Pilkada it reached 1,529 cases. The methods are even more sophisticated and diverse, involving many actors, starting from the Deputy Regent, the

success team and ordinary people. The two findings above actually confirm the assumption that in every electoral moment, both at the local and national levels, money is a determining factor in the election of a candidate.

A study conducted by Pramono Anung states that a candidate costs between 300 million and 6 billion to become a member of the DPR. Of course, this nominal will increase considering that the research was conducted before the 2014 election. So this high-cost politics will in turn have an effect on the abuse of official power when in power (Tan, 2018). This precedent can be seen from the many political officials who were caught in corruption cases under the pretext of returning their candidacy capital. The Research and Development Study (R&D) of the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2015 in evaluating simultaneous local elections stated that the costs spent by each candidate ranged from 25-30 billion for regents/mayors and 20-100 billion for governors. As for the Presidential Election (Pilpres), a study by Forbes Magazine states that a candidate needs at least around 7 trillion in funds to compete.

These fees are used for many things, one of which is for the practice of money politics. More specifically, in the context of winning regional heads, a study conducted by [10], states that at least a candidate must prepare adequate logistics for 4 things; buying nomination recommendations from political parties, hiring political consultants, financing political machinery and political campaigns and conducting money politics.

The amount of political costs that must be incurred by a candidate is inseparable from the need to carry out money politics. In the Indonesian political tradition, money politics seems to be a winning political action that must be carried out. Candidates need to provide a special budget to carry out money politics. Unfortunately, this is

directly proportional to the permissiveness of society in money politics. The Charta Politica survey for March 19-25 2019 stated that 45.6 percent of respondents said they understood the practice of money politics. Meanwhile, 39.1 percent did not understand, and 15.4 percent did not know or did not answer.

One of the logical reasons behind the practice of massive money politics is closely related to the pragmatic type of floating voters. In simple terms, pragmatic refers to the orientation of human nature and attitudes which tend to be practical, framed and rigid. John Dewey (1859-1952), a adherent of the pragmatist school of thought, explained that this trait can arise and develop due to the intensive relationship between organisms/humans and their environment. In seeing the truth, this flow measures it based on its benefit to humans.

In the political context, the term pragmatism experiences a more negative operationalization. There is a shift in the meaning of pragmatism in political life with a view to showing the short-term orientation of political actors to be able to win political competition. This negative tendency arises as a result of the lust for power, and often this orientation leads political actors towards an attitude that is more concerned with the goal of being in power than what will be done after being in power.

In the context of voters or society, pragmatism is reflected in the determination of political preferences (votes) based on transactional considerations. In this case who can provide short-term economic benefits. This is where money politics works by buying voter support. That is why the object of money politics is often people from the lower economic class. It is they who are vulnerable to being exploited by money politics on the grounds of economic difficulties (Priyono & Hamid (ed) 2014). Voter pragmatism cannot be separated from

the low ideological ties of voters with political parties.

The functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation and representation failed to be played by political parties so that the public (voters) lost support so that loyalty was not formed. Floating masses with pragmatic characteristics are determined by the fragility of ideological ties with political parties so that they do not have strong loyalty to one political position. Their choice is then very vulnerable to change and money becomes one of the instruments that voters are waiting for to get their vote.

Previous studies on money politics in Indonesia are actually still limited, especially when assembling the dimensions of money politics from the Party-ID aspect. A compilation of research results outlined in a book entitled *Money Politics in Indonesia* (2015) clearly records how money politics is a vote-buying campaign activity that is commonly used by many politicians who are candidates for DPRD in order to get elected. Money politics with its various modes (pork barrels, bribes, social programs such as free medical treatment, gatherings, project appointments, etc.) is a systematic model and is very popular with politicians to build patronage and clientelism [9].

The power of money politics turned out to be efficiently implemented in the election of members of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) and regional heads. Edward Aspinall and friends' research found that the dawn attack as a form of money politics was effective in mobilizing votes. Specifically, this research with the scope of local politics found that 60-80 percent of voters cast their ballots for DPRD candidates who gave them money or other physical goods. As for regional head elections, it was recorded that 40-60 percent of voters allowed their votes to be exchanged for money or goods.

## **5. Personalization of Political Party Leadership**

The majority of political parties in Indonesia in the reform era have been trapped in the problem of political personalization. Party elite individuals become the image of the party as well as people who are very influential in making party policies in the long term. In fact, political parties already have succession mechanisms, but one elite figure is still able to personalize his party. Basically, each political party has its own mechanism for selecting leaders, which can be through deliberation, acclamation or voting, and all of these mechanisms are contained in the party's Bylaws. However, the tendency that occurs in the succession of party leadership is acclamation with a single candidate, as if it does not open up opportunities for other party cadres to take part in the succession. Likewise when filling out the party management structure. Not infrequently the strategic positions of political parties are filled by those closest to the party chairman, without going through a democratic mechanism.

Personalization of the party thus can also occur due to economic motives to support the party. When the regeneration of party leadership stops and party funding only comes from a figure or a networked party with stakeholders only through one particular key actor, then the party's association with that figure cannot be avoided. This is solely done to maintain the wheels of political party activity. As a result, stagnation of leadership becomes inevitable. This phenomenon continued to occur for a long time, giving birth to kinship and even dynastic politics, no longer being a cadre-based party.

The bad impact of personalization is that the party ignores the rules. In relation to the proper rules, political parties build internal democratization (intra-party democracy) by involving the widest possible participation



of members/cadres so that every decision-making is carried out in an open, participatory and deliberative manner.

Another impact of personalization is the stagnation of party regeneration. Patron client culture is still the dominant factor in a career in the party, especially in terms of central leadership contestation. At the central level, party regeneration in terms of the general chairperson position of the majority of parties is still dominated by the old elite, and several parties have even

failed to carry out regeneration and recirculation.

Party personalization if maintained in the long term also has the potential to trigger factionalization and conflict. Factions are intra-party groups, whose members share a common identity and goals and work together to achieve these goals. The faction objectives can vary, among others; maintaining party patronage and control, influencing party policy and proposing a new set of values within the party

### **CONSTRUCTION AND STRATEGY FOR BUILDING POLITICAL PARTIES**

<b>Construction</b>	<b>Strategy</b>
Recruitment patterns Standardization of cadres Continuous regeneration.	Party political school (elementary, middle, high) Standardization of political party cadres Cadre political career path (meritocracy) Development of Character Cadre Education
Cadre Motivation Vision and Mission of Political Parties Politician Statesman	Cadre motivation training Development of party organizational culture Punishment and reward commitment
Development of a political mass base Contribution to the performance of Local Government Contribution to national development	Running party programs with effective, efficient, fair and ethical principles Blusukan to the mass base intensively in the framework of coaching and aspiration nets
Productive collaboration between party cadres Collaboration of productive programs of political parties	Collaboration and synergy of party programs by each cadre Building fostered areas on an ongoing basis based on the party's program
Commitment and consistency of leaders in carrying out the vision and mission of political parties Become a role model leader for members of political parties and members of political parties	Strengthening exemplary and leadership with integrity through party schools and political practice Increasing pioneering and providing youth leadership opportunities through the composition of the management structure of 50%

### **CONCLUSION**

Based on the results of the research and discussion that have been described, it can be concluded that political parties in Indonesia entering the Reformation Era are still faced with contemporary conceptual problems of political parties. The political party cadre system is unable to build cadre capacity because there is no capacity standardization in the cadre recruitment process. Starting to shift the quality of cadre capacity from competence and integrity capacity to financial capacity is the main cause of internal problems in political parties. Procedural democracy and substantive democracy are the reality of the democratic process in the field. Within the framework of procedural democracy, Indonesia already has democratic institutions and institutions. However, there are still problems with its implementation in procedures such as problems in elections,

the application of the rule of law that is not yet optimal, and the correlation between the government and oligarchic groups which threatens the stability of checks and balances in the government system.

High political costs lead to a transactional democratic process which results in the emergence of money politics in society. Political parties have not yet emerged figures from the younger generation resulting from regular, structured and measurable regeneration processes so that leadership personalization still occurs in political parties.

Political parties still do not have a clear identity in carrying out political practices whether they are included in political pragmatism or political idealism. The pattern of preparing human resources is to use a cadre party system or an open party. Political education for cadres and political

education for the people is still a big job to be done by political parties in Indonesia.

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